Impact of cohorting for multidrug-resistant organisms with and without real-time feedback by Wongcharoen, Sunee et al.




Impact of cohorting for multidrug-resistant










Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/open_access_pubs
This Open Access Publication is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons@Becker. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open
Access Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Becker. For more information, please contact engeszer@wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wongcharoen, Sunee; Luxamesathaporn, Pornpong; Khawcharoenporn, Thana; Rujanavech, Sassinuch; Warren, David K.; and
Apisarnthanarak, Anucha, ,"Impact of cohorting for multidrug-resistant organisms with and without real-time feedback." Infection
Control and Hospital Epidemiology.34,6. 648-650. (2013).
http://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/open_access_pubs/1421
Authors
Sunee Wongcharoen, Pornpong Luxamesathaporn, Thana Khawcharoenporn, Sassinuch Rujanavech, David
K. Warren, and Anucha Apisarnthanarak
This open access publication is available at Digital Commons@Becker: http://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/open_access_pubs/1421
Impact of Cohorting for Multidrug-Resistant Organisms with and without Real-Time
Feedback
Author(s): Sunee Wongcharoen, MD; Pornpong Luxamesathaporn, MD; Thana
Khawcharoenporn, MD; Sassinuch Rujanavech, MD; David K. Warren, MD, MPH; Anucha
Apisarnthanarak, MD
Source: Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Vol. 34, No. 6 (June 2013), pp. 648-650
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of
America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670641 .
Accessed: 02/06/2013 19:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The University of Chicago Press and The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 128.252.11.235 on Sun, 2 Jun 2013 19:06:37 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
648 infection control and hospital epidemiology june 2013, vol. 34, no. 6
the report should not be construed as endorsement by the Agency for Health-
care Research and Quality or the US Department of Health and Human
Services.
Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2013;34(6):647-648
 2013 by The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America. All rights
reserved. 0899-823X/2013/3406-0020$15.00. DOI: 10.1086/670645
references
1. Crnich CJ, Drinka P. Predicting the impact of contact precautions
on methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus outcomes: caution
up ahead. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2013;34(6):646–647 (in
this issue).
2. Lee BY, Singh A, Bartsch SM, et al. The potential regional impact
of contact precaution use in nursing homes to control methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol
2013;34(2):151–160.
3. Lee BY, McGlone SM, Wong KF, et al. Modeling the spread of
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) outbreaks
throughout the hospitals in Orange County, California. Infect
Control Hosp Epidemiol 2011;32(6):562–572.
4. Lee BY, Bartsch SM, Wong KF, et al. Simulation shows hospitals
that cooperate on infection control obtain better results than
hospitals acting alone. Health Aff 2012;31(10):2295–2303.
5. Lee BY, Bartsch SM, Wong KF, et al. The importance of nursing
homes in the spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) among hospitals. Med Care 2013;51:205–215.
6. Lee BY, Yilmaz SL, Wong KF, et al. Modeling the regional spread
and control of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE). Am J
Infect Control (forthcoming).
7. Murphy CR, Eells SJ, Quan V, et al. Methicillin-resistant Staph-
ylococcus aureus burden in nursing homes associated with envi-
ronmental contamination of common areas. J Am Geriatr Soc
2012;60(6):1012–1018.
8. Kreman T, Hu J, Pottinger J, Herwaldt LA. Survey of long-term-
care facilities in Iowa for policies and practices regarding residents
with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus or vancomycin-
resistant enterococci. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2005;26(10):
811–815.
Impact of Cohorting for Multidrug-
Resistant Organisms with and without
Real-Time Feedback
To the Editor—Creating a cohorting area is recommended by
several guidelines as a strategy to prevent transmission of
multidrug-resistant organisms.1,2 The use of a cohort area,
coupled with real-time feedback of compliance with infection
prevention measures (eg, hand hygiene and gowning and
gloving for isolation patients), has successfully contained
multidrug-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii transmission in
a resource-limited setting.3 The additive effect of patient co-
horting and real-time feedback versus the creation of a de-
fined cohort area alone has not been previously examined.
Observation and real-time feedback is a resource-intensive
practice; therefore, understanding its contribution to com-
pliance with infection prevention measures is important. We
conducted a study to evaluate the effect of creating a cohort
area with and without frequent real-time feedback on com-
pliance with infection prevention practices to prevent trans-
mission of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs).
A 2-period observational study to evaluate compliance with
infection prevention practices was conducted in a 30-bed
open unit at Thammasat University, Pathumthani, Thailand.
The unit nurse-to-patient ratio was 1 : 8. We created an 8-
bed cohort area in the unit, with 1 nurse per shift being
assigned to care for patients in this area. Two 1-hour edu-
cational sessions per month were provided to all unit nurses
on the importance of adherence to the infection control mea-
sures. Observations using a standardized data collection tool
were performed by infectious diseases physicians (S.W. and
P.L.) on isolation equipment preparation (eg, isolation signs
being posted and availability of isolation equipment, such as
gloves, gowns, masks, alcohol gel, and stethoscopes), infection
control practices (eg, hand hygiene before and after patient
contact, appropriate use of gloves and gowns, and environ-
mental cleaning), and time spent with each patient. Hand
hygiene compliance was defined as the number of observa-
tions for which hand hygiene was performed before and after
patient contact divided by the total number of observed hand
hygiene opportunities. Monitoring of environmental cleaning
was performed as described elsewhere.3 In period 1 (Septem-
ber 1–30, 2012) no feedback of observations was given to
staff, while in period 2 (November 1–30, 2012) real-time
feedback on infection control adherence was provided to
healthcare workers (HCWs) in the cohort area. Real-time
feedback was performed by an infection control nurse when
HCWs did not perform hand washing or wear an isolation
gown 3 times a week. To avoid an impact of education on
infection control practices, we allowed a 1-month washout
period (October 1–31, 2012) during which neither cohorting
nor education was performed.
During the study, there were 600 observations performed
(300 in period 1 and 300 in period 2). In period 1 there was
no significant difference in isolation equipment preparation
and infection control compliance between the cohort and
noncohort areas. In period 2 there was a significantly higher
compliance with infection control practices in the cohort ver-
sus the noncohort area, and HCWs spent more time caring
for patients in the cohort area (Table 1). Notably, compliance
with gown use was still low in the cohort area (37.2%). When
comparing period 2 with period 1, there was a significant
increase in the frequency of environmental cleaning in the
cohort and noncohort area, and the proportion of each spe-
cific MDRO was different. However, there was no significant
change in other isolation precaution practices within the non-
cohort area (Table 1).
Contact isolation is a key measure to prevent the spread
of MDROs by indirect contact in the hospital. Previous data
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table 1. Outcome of Cohort Section with and without Real-Time Feedback










Nurse-to-patient ratio, mean  SD 0.21  0.02** 0.17  0.01 0.25  0.03** 0.16  0.02
Resource utilization
Isolation sign posted 150 (100) 149 (99.3) 150 (100) 150 (100)
Isolation equipment provided 150 (100) 150 (100) 150 (100)** 137 (91.3)
Hand hygiene 63 (42.0) 71 (47.3) 99 (66.0)* 81 (54.0)
Contact isolation
Gloves used 58 (38.7) 45 (30.0) 108 (72.0)** 36 (24.0)
Gown worn 18 (12.0) 20 (13.3) 56 (37.3)* 25 (16.7)
Time spent with patient
≤2 minutes 92 (61.3) 79 (52.7) 43 (28.7) 74 (49.3)
12 minutes 58 (38.7) 71 (47.3) 107 (71.3)** 76 (50.7)
Type of MDROsa
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae 12 (8.0) 23 (15.3) 48 (32) 45 (30.0)
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 42 (28.0) 2 (1.3) 54 (36) 53 (35.9)
Acinetobacter baumannii 109 (72.6) 127 (84.6) 77 (51.3) 63 (42.0)
MRSA 46 (30.6) 15 (10.0) 18 (12.0) 40 (26.6)
Environmental cleaning
≤2 times per day 150 (100) 150 (100) 15 (10.0) 15 (10.0)
12 times per day 0 (0) 0 (0) 135 (90.0) 135 (90.0)
note. Data are no. (%), unless otherwise indicated. ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase; MDROs, multidrug-
resistant microorganisms; MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SD, standard deviation.
a Because 1 person may have more than 1 MDRO, total sums are more than 100%; the pattern of all MDROs was
different between periods 1 and 2 ( ).P ! .05
* versus noncohort area in the same study period.P ! .05
** versus noncohort area in the same study period.P ! .001
suggest that contact isolation may be harmful to patients by
reducing the frequency and duration of HCW encounters.4,5
We found that creating a cohort area did not reduce the time
spent with patients and actually increased the time spent in
patient care during cohorting with feedback. Although the
reason why is unclear, we postulate that being an open unit
would have an impact on time spent in patient care during
cohort. Despite the creation of a cohort area, compliance with
some infection control practices (eg, wearing a gown) were
still suboptimal.
There are some limitations to this study. This study was
performed in an open unit and may not be generalizable to
other settings. Since we did not measure the transmission
dynamics for MDROs, we cannot conclude that frequent real-
time feedback would actually prevent MDRO transmission.
We also did not measure other variables, such as frequency
of patient contact in the cohort area or attitude of HCWs
and patients toward cohorting. Despite these limitations, our
study suggests that compliance of contact isolation and hand
hygiene is significantly increased only when frequent real-
time feedback (3 times per week) is performed and that cre-
ating a cohort area alone is insufficient to change HCW be-
havior. Additional studies are needed to evaluate the impact
of strategies to prevent the transmission of MDROs in
resource-limited healthcare settings.
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Patient Isolation in the High-Prevalence
Setting: Challenges with Regard to
Multidrug-Resistant Gram-Negative Bacilli
To the Editor—Isolation of patients for prevention and control
of infections is a standard intervention in infection control
practices. Patients infected or colonized with infective agents
that are potentially transmissible are physically isolated in a
separate room with protective barriers so as to prevent trans-
mission from patients to other patients, staff, or visitors. Ex-
amples of infections for which such isolation practices are
implemented include tuberculosis, pandemic viral infections,
chickenpox, measles, infectious diarrhea or vomiting, and
those caused by multidrug-resistant bacteria. Since infections
caused by multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) have be-
come a major health concern in recent times, these infections
are often the most common cause of keeping a patient under
barrier precautions and preventive isolation.1
The Tata Medical Center is a newly built modern cancer
care center in eastern India. The incidence of community-
acquired infections, such as tuberculosis, viral gastroenteritis,
and viral respiratory infections, is relatively low in this hos-
pital, and most infection control concerns are regarding mul-
tidrug-resistant healthcare-associated infections. Our expe-
rience for the past 19 months has shown that the prevalence
of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is low
in this setting (∼10%), whereas infections caused by multi-
drug-resistant gram-negative bacilli, such as those caused by
extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL) producers and car-
bapenem-resistant organisms, comprise the overwhelming
majority of infections (ESBL rate, approximately 70%; car-
bapenem resistance rate, approximately 20%). A significant
proportion of patients visiting this tertiary care referral hos-
pital are already colonized with various MDROs. Results from
the surveillance cultures of stool samples done near the time
of admission or preintervention in hematology and some
surgical patients show a high rate of colonization of patients
with various MDROs. The surveillance culture antibiogram
is similar in pattern to the antibiogram from diagnostic sam-
ples. In this context of high prevalence of MDRO colonization
or infection, universal isolation of patients on the basis of
MDRO status becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.
The hospital has a 47-bed general ward with 1 isolation room,
an 11-bed intensive care unit with 5 isolation rooms, and a
significant number of single-bed private rooms for patients
requiring general or special medical care who are able to
afford a higher rate. Emergency ward, day care unit, pediatric,
and postoperative patients are managed in open bays that
have a bed capacity of 5–6. Patients coming to this hospital
are assigned a specific bed location on the basis of clinical
need (eg, intensive care/high-dependency support), age group
or specialty (eg, pediatrics), and type of intervention (eg,
chemotherapy in day care unit, postsurgical intervention cases
in surgical bays). For optimal patient placement, it often be-
comes difficult to achieve a balance among clinical need,
available resources, infection control requirements, and pa-
tient preferences.
Being a philanthropic initiative, the hospital has invested
heavily in optimal bed spacing (space between beds of 1.2–
1.5 m against a World Health Organization [WHO]–rec-
ommended standard of 1–2 m; area available per patient in
a general ward of 7–8.4 m2), good housekeeping, staff training
and education on infection control, water-quality monitoring,
infection prevention bundles, and optimal selection and use
of disinfectants and less in expensive and difficult-to-main-
tain isolation rooms.2 Daily infection control e-mail messages
are sent to concerned department doctors, medical admin-
istration, nursing, and housekeeping along with the quality
manager to notify them about new MDRO cases. The e-mail
contains standard instructions about WHO guidelines related
to barrier precautions, hand hygiene, enhanced cleanliness,
housekeeping, and use of personal protective equipment
(PPE).2 A biohazard label is electronically flagged in the hos-
pital management system whenever an MDRO is detected in
a patient to remind the user through a visual alert about
infection control precautions to be taken. In the real world
of optimal patient placement and bed management, priority
is often given to clinical needs and logistical feasibility, over-
riding theoretical infection control concerns. In this hospital,
universal precautions are emphasized and barrier precautions
are followed for patients infected or colonized with MDROs.
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